Book Analysis of The ‘Joy Bangla’ Deception (Part – II)

(If you have not read the first part of the analysis (click here), we highly recommend you to read it to understand the context and for enhanced understanding.)

    Two aspects ought to be made clear to the readers at the very onset before s/he proceeds to the second part of this book analysis. Firstly, the history of Bangladesh is not to be equated to the history of Bangla (or Bengali) and, secondly, the history of Bangladesh suffers from a peculiar case of bipolar disorder since the claims to the freedom struggle and their narratives keep on changing according to the whims of the political party that rules the country at a given period. On one hand, the Awami League led by Mujibur Rahman claims that they liberated Bangladesh through political and diplomatic manoeuvres and, on the other hand, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Ziaur Rahman ascribes itself as the military instalment that chased the Pakistani soldiers out. Bangladesh’s history keeps being written and rewritten based on the narrative of the ruling party, whichever comes to power.

    However, both the parties have catered to the frenzy of the Islamist bigots of the country. Whereas the Awami League has covertly oppressed the minority of the Bangladesh, the BNP has launched scathing attacks on the minority overtly and unabashedly for victory of the kafirs is a fundamental tenet of the religion. However, there has been a ploy to whitewash the religious fundamentalism of the former as compared to the latter. So, was the Awami League any better than its opponent force? Whereas the BNP was rancorous to the minority, was the Awami League friendly to it?

    If we seek to find the answer in the narratives, we may encounter biases, but the statistical data would never lie. That is why Kausik Gangopadhyaya and Devavrata have always relied on data to back up their claims. Citing two critical studies titled An Inquiry into Causes and Consequences of Deprivation of Hindu Minorities in Bangladesh through the Vested Property (PRIP Trust, 2000) and Deprivation of Hindu Minority in Bangladesh: Living with Vested Property (Pathak Samabesh, 2008) by Dr. Abul Barkat, an economist and professor at the Dhaka University, the authors have exposed the gruesome reality of Bangladesh’s all-party loot and plunder of minority properties. Here is graphic representation of Dr. Barkat’s research find-outs:

Source: Abul Barkat (2011, pp. 109-10)

    The authors have explained in lucid terms the shams like the Enemy Property Act (which later became the Vested Property Act) which have been detrimental not only to the Hindus of Bangladesh, but also to the country’s projected ‘secular’ credentials. Of course, there can be no doubt that land-grabbing has not only been a societal form of jihadist oppression resulting a community-level clashes, but it becomes problematic when it unfolds its ugly ramifications in the political spectrum. Take for instance the audacious and ungrateful remarks of M. R. Akhtar Mukul in his autobiography, Ami Bijay Dekhechi, to the Hindus of Bangladesh who fled to India owing to the atrocities: “You have provided us shelter and offered us support, considering us one of your own folks. We, therefore, offer you our gratitude. This gratitude, however, does not mean that those of you who have come to India by crossing the border in 1947, 1950, 1958, 1962, or 1965, would be able to go back to live at the land of your birth, as Bangladesh has become independent... I presented to you the crude reality. You would only suffer from psychological agony if you dream of fantastic unreal things”[1]. It should come as no surprise to a political observer, who has kept his/her eyes open and has not sold his/her soul to the leftist propaganda supported by Arabic petrodollars, that the rampant insemination of the jihadist teachings into mind of the ordinary people by the madrasas and the mosques would someday culminate into a vengeful reality where one side would be pitted against the other and, since the majority is being unconditionally backed up by the government and bureaucracy in this case, the minority would be before the edge of the sword. “In many areas, more harm was done to Bengal Hindus by Bengali Muslims than by the West Pakistan Army… In 1971, after examining available evidence, the International Commission of Jurists concludes 127, There is overwhelming evidence that Hindus were slaughtered and their houses and villages destroyed simply because they were Hindus. The oft repeated phrase ‘Hindus are enemies of the state’ as a justification for the killing does not gainsay the intent to commit genocide; rather does it confirm the intention. The Nazis regarded the Jews as enemies of the state and killed them as such. In our view there is a strong prima facie case that the crime of genocide was committed against the group comprising the Hindu population of East Bengal”, noted the authors (pp. 121-123).

    However, the goal of this jihadist sentiment is not limited to issue of minority in Bangladesh, but it is a part of a deeper and even more sinister conspiracy. To understand this, Bhasani’s instigating remark in January, 1972, becomes pivotal: “Assam is mine, West Bengal is mine, and Tripura, too, is mine. Until those regions are liberated back from India, neither the liberation of Bangladesh nor its map is complete” (p. xliii). Does not this echo the recent statements made by the unelected head of the interim government when he wooed his Chinese bosses by saying that ‘the seven sisters’ (seven North Eastern states of India) are landlocked, implying that Chinese investment in Bangladesh would keep India concerned?[2] Or, take for instance, the comments of Muhammad Yunus’ close aide, Mahfuz Alam, when he boastfully claimed Bengal, Assam, and Tripura are part of Bangladesh and they must strive to seize them?[3] But, what fuels this audacity one might ask. Here, the authors have been very mindful to denote its underlying implications for India, especially in the contemporary times. They argue that, “Not only is Bangladesh no match for India, power wise, but also their existence depends on their ability to leverage on India. The insurance of Bangladesh, therefore, lies in having a Hindu community whose safety would compel India not to go overboard against Bangladesh. The Hindu minority should be like the French proverb of Sois belle et tais-toi (Be pretty and shut up)” (p. 210).

    And yet, very ironically, we find the rampant whitewashing of Islamism propagandized by the left. On odd days, we find the left-leaning economist Amartya Sen saying that “in terms of the kind of narrowness of Hindu thinking, it is not reflected in a similar narrowness of Muslim thinking in Bangladesh”[4], and, on even days, we find leftist filmmaker Ritwik Ghatak linking the trauma of partition to mere displacement from homeland owing to societal circumstances. None, we ever see, attempts to pin the actual reason on the bulletin. Even the longest serving Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, who had lost his ancestral property in Bangladesh due to illegal encroachments on Hindu properties by Muslims, has seldom spoken on the condition of the Hindus there and passively accepted the Islamic fundamentalism in the state. Communists like Jyoti Basu see the entire event in the dialectical light of class struggle where the aristocrat and the bourgeoisie Hindus were ousted by the proletariat Mulsims. These leftist intellectuals weave a false idea that communalism was not the cause of the displacement of the people, but socialism was. The authors note:  Is it the case that this loss of land by the Hindus is an outcome of establishment of socialist policies (land reform) in Bangladesh and the Hindus being a rich class lost more? This is exactly what left-liberals like Amartya Sen propagate to the world. In their imagined worldview, Bangladesh is a secular socialist paradise with the lands of rich Hindus being redistributed among the poor Muslims. Now, the data-driven understanding of the reality as unearthed by Professor Barkat, renders the left-liberal claim null and void, as these laws made 60% of the Hindus landless” (p. 143).

              So, the truth is evident despite the leftist hoodwinks that the emaciation of the minority in the demographics is orchestrated by the national policy of Bangladesh, irrespective of political parties or their ideologies. Perhaps, that is why the Awami League, which once dropped ‘Muslim’ from its title to cater to the Hindu minority voters, went closer to the radical Islamist group called Hefazat-e-Islam when they realized that they would not be in power otherwise since the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami established tight bonds. So, how does this full-fledged Islamist country go on to paint a secular image? That the authors have categorically delineated.

Secular Rhetoric for an Islamic State

    Let us pick the figure of Abul Mansur Ahmad, the most secular and liberal of contemporary leaders during the turbulent times of Bangladesh (or East Pakistan) for the purpose of defining the highest maxim of Bangladesh’s secularist stance. He founded the socialist Krishak Praja Party and social and economic equality mattered more to him than fuelling dogmatism. Although a practising Muslim, he would go on to embrace the modern political theorists and ideologues. He identified himself that whilst an atheist, he is a Muslim atheist and if a communist, he is Muslim communist— notwithstanding the tantalizing oxymoron in their juxtaposition. He proposed: “Bangladesh is not an Islamic state but a Muslim state nonetheless”.

    All very good and lofty up until now, right? This is exactly where the authors show their subtlety of analysis. They highlight that the word ‘nonetheless’ in Ahmad’s statement hides the seed of dogmatism, for his very friend, Ataur Rahman had made it very clear that “Islam is not a religion in the common sense of the term or as the other religionists understand it. Islam is a complete code of life, which means that Islam controls the system of life-yours and mine regarding faith and worldly matters. Non-acceptance of this idea is tantamount to non-acceptance of Islam”[5]. The authors opine that “Since Islam controls the system of life on worldly matters, ‘religious bigotry’ could very well be part of Muslimhood. Moreover, Islam is a proselytizing religion-which, in effect, means that it considers itself superior to other religions. This idea of superiority could, potentially, translate into ‘hatred towards other religions’ for many people with Muslimhood, as Islam controls the system of life regarding faith. While we are not implying at all that Muslims cannot become secular persons an individual Muslim could very well be as broad-minded, tolerant and pluralistic as Kazi Nazrul Islam but to make a Muslim society secular, it may require a lot of reformation in the dominant religious narrative of the Indian Muslim society, which did not happen in Bangladesh” (pp. 131-132).

                The nature of the Islamist theology is such that its followers end up becoming a fanatic mob that looks for uniformity and maintain it at the cost of diversity. The authors show how the Lahore Resolution (1940) suggested that since the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, these areas should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. There was no mention of ‘Islamic State’ in the Lahore Resolution which helped in dividing the nation, but yet Pakistan went on to become an Islamic state with Islamist policies (p. 134). One must realize, as Abul Mansur Ahmad categorically asserted that in reality “neither Pakistan is broken by the liberation of Bangladesh, nor ‘Two-Nation Theory’ was proven false. Instead of one Pakistan, two Pakistans have happened as per the Lahore Resolution. The Government of India has assisted us to realise the Lahore Resolution and we are grateful to them. Both the states are not called Pakistan, but that should not create any confusion. The Lahore Resolution does not mention the word ‘Pakistan’, only ‘Muslim-majority state’. This means that people are supposed to decide the name of the state later. People of the West have named their state Pakistan, we, the eastern people, are calling it Bangladesh. Surely this is not confusing at all”[6].

    Tracing the chronological development of Bangladesh indeed consolidates Abul Mansur Ahmad’s statement boldly than ever. Take for example, how Bangladesh joined the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 1974 under Mujib’s Awami League regime; or how Ziaur Rahman removed ‘socialism’ and ‘secularism’ from the constitution in 1978 after coming to power and replaces them with “Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim (In the name of Allah, the most merciful)” in the beginning of the constitution; or how Bangladesh established the Islamic University of Bangladesh in 1979, a year before Pakistan could establish the Islamic University of Pakistan; or how Ershad’s Jatiya Party recognized Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh in the 8^th amendment of the constitution in 1988 after coming to power for the first time. It is interesting to note that Mujibur’s Awami League has been the archrival of Ziaur Rahman’s BNP as the former accused the latter in having played a major role in Mujib’s assassination. Later, Ziaur too was killed in a military coup in 1981 and Ershad came to power after an election which was boycotted by both the Awami League and the BNP. Thus, it can be observed though these political parties are hostile to each other for establishing their respective dominion, they all have promoted the cause of Islamist expansion, proving Ataur Rahman’s statement true.

    “Hinduism does not remotely mean the same thing as Islam does. Forget about the worldly matters, but even on matters of faith, nobody knows what Hinduism says and what does not. Understandably Hinduism is not a proselytizing religion, either. This is why Hinduness of a Hindu may not contradict with not having ‘religious bigotry’ or ‘hatred towards other religions’”, opine the authors (p. 132). The difference between the monotheistic extremism of Islam and the liberalism of a pluralistic civilization like the Hindus has been highlighted through the very words of Abul Mansur Ahmad, a renowned lawyer and a politician who worked for Indian National Congress and the Awami Muslim League. After the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Prafulla Chandra Roy had asked him to pen an article on the sad event. The author himself asserts that “In that article, I cursed the Hindu people in the most acerbic manner. I said the proof of the loftiness of Mahatma Gandhi is the meanness of the Hindu people. The more difficult a disease becomes, we need a physician of that big stature to be cured..... This proves that the Hindu people are the worst among human beings. At the same time, it furthermore proves that Mahatma Gandhi is the greatest and loftiest man in the present world since Allah must have sent the best human being on earth for treatment of the most fallen and worst of the peoples” (p. 133). The author had relentlessly abused the Hindus in the article and he had expected rebuttals by the Hindu columnists. But, to his utter surprise, he was lauded with applause by the ‘liberal’ Hindus for praising Gandhi at the cost of Hinduism. The author himself then reflects: “After my anger had subsided, I realised that I received honour and praise by cursing the Hindu people in Hindustan (India; the land of Hindus). Uttering such things against Muslims-whether in Pakistan or in Hindustan-I had to leave this world, right behind Mahatma Gandhi. Therefore, my final realisation dawned on me: The Hindu society is mean but they are lofty enough to realise that meanness.”[7]

Bengali Culture and Early Muslims of Bengal

     So, how were these ‘mean’ Hindu folks of Bengal? Were they really as vile as Abul Mansur Ahmad paints them? Are these ‘mean’ people barbaric hatemonger? Or did they assimilate with others? How were the early Muslims of Bengal— the Muslims who were converted to Islam by being made to shed their ‘mean’ Hindu identity on the edge of the sword? The authors record that the early Muslims of Bengal, most of whom were converted from Hinduism, were greatly enamoured by the Hindu culture and rituals. The authors refer to a ‘punthi’ (hand-written manuscript) of Maulana Siddiq Ali of Sylhet which he wrote in 1850, accusing the Bengali Muslims unpremeditatedly committing many acts of shirk or blasphemy by being influenced by the Hindus. He lists out over two hundred such acts of worship that the early Bengali Muslims had straightway imported from Hindu theology. The ‘punthi’ “shows that Muslims used to offer their puja to most of the indigenous (Hindu) deities like Chandi, Mangal Chandi, Kal Bhairavi, Shani (Saturn), Naga (serpent), Charhak (Mahakal for year ending) etc. Moreover, they had the convention of invoking different pirs, bibis for different purposes which were identical to that of Hindus like keeping their cows and calves safety. The birthday of the Prophet was celebrated like Janmashami of the Hindus and the death anniversary of a pir (Urs) was like a Hindu Shraddha. Like Hindus worship Vishnu-Pada-Padma (the lotus feet of Vishnu), Muslims used to worship the replica of feet of the Prophet— a remnant of that tradition could be found in the Kadan Rasul mosque of Chittagong. Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet used to be worshipped as a bibi. Hasan-Hussayn were more popular than the Prophet, particularly among women” (p. 168). So, we can observe that the early Muslims were very much Indic in their approach to worship. Therefore, it is needless to say that the later fanatic Islamists would definitely consider them as ‘mean’ too and would strive to bring them back to their Islamist fold— and we see such attempts. Islamic revivalists like Syed Ahmad Barelvi and Titumir encouraged the contemporary Muslims of the Indian subcontinent to regress back to Sharia-driven lifestyle. They invoked the early Muslims of Bengal to trim their moustache and grow beard, replace dhoti with lungi or pyjamas, have Arabic names instead of Indic names, and denounce all forms of Hindu-styled acts of worship.

                The result of this zealous call for Arabisation of the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent at the cost of their indigenous culture and ethnicity has been lauded by Syed Ali Ahsan, Bangladesh’s National Professor and the recipient of the Ekushe Padak (the second highest civilian honour of the country), who opined that “Muslims brought a new faith, breathed new life into the culture of this country and inaugurated a wonderful human consciousness” (p. 173). However, a very basic scrutiny of the aftermath would suggest that Professor Syed Ali Ahsan’s words hold to water at all and they are mere verbosity of his rabid Islamist tendency. At this point, it is to be remembered that Syed Ali Ahsan is also the poet who penned Bakhtiyarer Ghora (The Horse of Bakhtiyar), a tribute to Bakhtiyar Khalji, the monarch who burned the Nalanda University to ashes. So, the authors are justified in taking a jibe at them by commenting: “The wonderful human consciousness mentioned by Professor Syed Ali Ahsan, made Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khalji to destroy all the famous universities of Bengal and Magadha on arrival... Interestingly, in an interview, this same intellectual said, ‘I can't imagine a world without books’. There is no doubt that the ‘wonderful human consciousness’ operated at the root of this ambivalence, or better said, a blind spot in thinking” (p. 173).

                Even if we keep the legitimacy of Syed Ali Ahsan’s statements aside, we come across another popular claim overemphasized by the leftist historians and ‘social scientists’ that the lower caste Hindus wholeheartedly welcomed this Islamic invasion and they willingly embraced Islam to get rid of the so-called oppressions by the upper caste people and Hindu aristocrats. However, the authors clarify that, in their due course of thorough research, they have found no evidence to back up such claims. They iterate that “when all Hindus are polytheist infidels to the Islamic rulers and clerics, why would they show special favour to the lower caste Hindus? Even in recent times, we have observed that the so-called lower caste Hindus including Namashudras have been oppressed the most in anti-Hindu massacres in East Bengal like in Noakhali of 1946, Dhaka-Barisal of 1950, Liberation War of 1971, after 1971” (p. 177). To back their claims, the authors cite eminent historian, Richard Eaton, who wrote explicitly that Islam was not there to oppose Hindu inequality, but to replace Hindu polytheism with Islamic monotheism.

Chaitanya and Bengal

    To debunk the propaganda of the left-leaning academics, we ought to take a look at the history of medieval Bengal and what can be better sources for that purpose than the hagiographies of Sri Chaitanya, one of the most reverend figures and cultural icons of Bengal? The authors have also delved into those texts to expose the utterly illogical propositions of Muslim patronage of lower caste Hindus and Hindu-Muslim unity. A few days ago, I had penned an article titled on the great master (click here to read) where I uncovered the intents of Allauddin Hussain Shah, the ruler of the Bengal Sultanate back then, whom the leftist historians cheer heavily as lofty and humanitarian sultan who established unity between the two communities. For instance, when Prof. Abu Mohammed Habibullah of Bangladesh praised Allauddin Hussain Shah as a liberal ruler, eminent historian Prof. Ramesh Chandra Majumdar retorted him back, reminding him of Chand Kazi’s persecution of the kirtana troupes and Sri Chaitanya’s successive rebellions against the throne. It is only by Chaitanya’s revolutionary steps that the Hindu devotees were allowed to perform kirtana on the streets of Bengal. It was, therefore, a delight to see that the authors of the book have also reflected upon the issue in the same light. However, what the authors add more in this context is even more fascinating. They go on to depict that “in response to Sri Chaitanya’s movement, numerous Muslim poets also composed verse on the Vaishnava subject of Radha-Krishna love. Jatindramohar Bhattacharya in his work, Banglar Vaishnava-Bhavapanna Musalman Kavi (The Muslim Poems Influenced by the Vaishnava Ideas) mentions about 450 verses composed by 102 Muslim poets under the Vaishnava influence... On the contrary, noted Marxist historian Irfan Habib accepts that Islam was not preaching any idea negating the caste system but rather the Islamic rulers have their own idea of hierarchy a was the idea of those times” (p. 178).

The History of Bengal and the Bengali Language

    The history of Bengal cannot be equated to the history of Bangladesh at all. The history of Bengal is simply as ancient as that of Bharata (India) since it has always been an integral part of the mainland. However, there has been a constant endeavour by Bangladeshi academia to appropriate the history of Bengal to the specific country, ignoring West Bengal and its Indic roots. Therefore, it is required to rebuff their pseudo-history and enlighten the new generation with true history of the region— something that the authors have traced as they remark: “The history of Bengal and the Bengali identity is ancient. The Aitareya Brahmana, three millennia old even by conservative estimates, mentions people of this region as ‘Pundra’. Aitareya Aranyaka mentions them as ‘Vanga’. Bhima’s conquest in the Mahabharata mentions peoples and places like Pundra, Vanga, Tamralipts, Karbat etc. all could be identified with Bengal” (p. 187). So, it is obvious that the ‘Bengali’ identity is largely inconsistent with the Islamist viewpoints. Ghulam Murshid, a pre-eminent intellectual and author of the book, Hajar Bacharer Bangali Sanskriti (A Thousand Years of Bengal Culture), has discussed this evolution of Bengali identity in Bangladesh in an article: “There was a time when, especially in West Bengal, ‘Bengali’ meant only Bengali-speaking Hindus. The words ‘Bengali’ and ‘Muslim’ meant Hindu and Muslim respectively. Muslims also had no particular objection to this understanding of identity, since many of the educated Muslims then thought that their homeland was the distant land of the Middle East, or at a minimum North India, and their mother tongue was Persian, or at a minimum Urdu”.

    Not just the history of the region, but the language itself has been the victim of Islamist dogmatism. In a race to Islamize the Bengali language, the ‘Muslim Bengalis’ of Bangladesh have injected thousands of Arabic and Persian words into it. This, the authors have noted in the preface as well: “Language is a vehicle as well as a memory bank of a culture. Bengali language was born out of Indic culture with more than 90% of words coming from Sanskrit roots. A cultural imperialism would, therefore, target language, as observed in Bangladesh. The race to Islamise the Bengali language through massive import of words from Arabic-Persian-Urdu is accelerating over time. Rabindranath Tagore, the cultural icon of Bengalis, denounced these efforts to insert words artificially and hijack the language. He did it repeatedly and assertively. Remarkably, it has gotten much worse since his times. In a decade after Tagore’s time, the number of such words was not even two thousand but today it is nine thousand and counting” (p. xxxvii). According to Rabindranath Tagore, saying ‘gosht’ instead of ‘mangsa’, ‘janab’ for ‘sudhi’, ‘arzu’ for ‘nibedan’, ‘dawat nama’ for ‘nimantran patra’, and ‘shadi mubarak’ for ‘shubho bibaho’ is clear case of infiltration. Hijacking the language in such an obnoxious fashion is not at all strengthening it, but rather it is slackening the authenticity and credibility of the language. No true Bengali, whether Hindu or Muslim, can and should afford this assault on his/her mother tongue. It is to be noted that Rabindranath Tagore too had highlighted his frustration and annoyance to these linguistic infiltrations: “If today’s Bengali language is unable to express the feelings of Bengali Muslims clearly and naturally, then they can abandon Bengali and adopt Urdu as their tongue. As sad as it would be for the Bengali people, it will be even sadder if the original form of the Bengali language is made miserable by abuse... Thousands of Persian and Arabic words have easily made their entry into Bengali, which possibly shows any lack of adamance, artificially or cross-section wise. But conscious use in the Bengali language- of those Parsi-Arabic words which are generally obsolete, or perhaps confined to one stratum, is intrusion. It is not wrong to use the word ‘khun’ in the sense of murder, as it has been well-accepted by all Bengalis. It is, however, futile to argue about the fact that ‘khun’ does not mean blood as a Bengali consensus” (p. 195).

    However, the sad predicament of present-day Bangladesh is that their Islamist bigotry has taken a toll over their mother tongue and ethnic identity. The removal of the literary works and scientific contributions of the Bengali Hindus from the academic syllabi, growing call to disown ‘Amar Sonar Bangla’ composed by a ‘Hindu’ Rabindranath Tagore, the rampant linguistic infiltrations— all paint an image of gloomy clouds hovering over the sky of Bangladesh. The craze of this Islamic frenzy is such that they can go on to any extent to perpetuate their legacy, even if that be at the expense of truth and reality. That is why noted litterateur, Humayun Azad, satirically said: “Tagore did not need a Nobel prize but Bengali literature desperately needed him to get the prize. Otherwise, Hindus would not have realised that he was a great poet. And, Muslims would have claimed one Rahim or one Karim as the greatest Bengali poet” (p. 208).

The Falsity of the Left Liberal Narrative

    One thing that the left does the best is weaving a narrative according to its vendetta. The case of Bangladesh serves as a prime example. See for instance how the BBC, based on who-knows-which godforsaken opinion poll, picked Mujib as “the greatest Bengali icon of a thousand years”. No Sri Chaitanya, no Rabindranath Tagore, no Swami Vivekananda, no Sri Aurobindo, but Sheikh Mujibur Rahman— the greatest Bengali icon of all time! Even uttering their names in a parallel stratum seems ludicrous, but that is what the BBC has to offer to us. Not just the BBC, see how The Economist picked Bangladesh— whose rank sinks into the chasm of global hunger and economics, where political destabilization runs as a norm, a country that ousted its Prime Minister and is being run for almost a year by an unelected, caretaking interim government— as “the country of the year that has progressed the most in that particular year in 2024”. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines the Bengalis to be a mixed race of Arab, Turkish, Persian descent and carefully drops their Indic roots. Are these merely their poor understanding or their vested interest with a more sinister plot?

    One postulation that I have in this regard is that Bangladesh has very craftily promoted the idea that Bangla and its culture is officially represented by the people of their nation and the Bengalis of West Bengal (India) are an offshoot of the larger Bengali community. Undoubtedly, this proposition is vague and preposterous, but one must reckon the way the Bangladesh has hijacked the entire onus of Bengali representation and they have successfully carried it. For instance, it is reported that Mujib once told Annada Shankar Roy that ‘Joy Bangla’ is a secular expression for ‘Bengaliness for Bengalis of India and Bangladesh’, but it was a flat lie. Bengali nationalism of the golden age of Vidyasagar, Tagore, Aurobindo and Vivekananda was based on progressive thinking, ideas of empowerment, and lofty idealism. But the ‘Joy Bangla’ of the Islamic Bangladesh is nothing but a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Noted historian and writer, Prof. Saradindu Mukherji, has very clearly noted in the preface of the book that the difference in “the relationship between the original inhabitants of the land, whose roots go back to the ancient days of Anga, Banga, and Kalinga, and the semi-Arabized Bengali speaking Muslims, whose origins are traced to the invasion of Bengal by Bakhtiyar Khilji and other alien invaders/preachers” is clearly distinctive. Unfortunately, the incumbent government of West Bengal (India) also hoots ‘Joy Bangla’ as its party slogan in elections, neither knowing the context nor the history behind the maxim. They must realize that refashioning ‘Joy Bangla’ to christen their welfare schemes not only raises serious concerns on national sovereignty, but also slackens their credibility. Why should Bengal of India follow war cry of Bangladeshi in the first place?

Calling a Spade a Spade

    In an opening note to the book, a Bangladeshi humanist who was formerly a Muslim and an Imam, Abdullah al Masud asserts his first-hand experience of the jihadist inculcation in the madrasas: “The Islamic theory of jihad, the theories of killing non-Muslims, theory of treating captured non-Muslim women in a Jihad as sex-slaves, the theories of approaching the wealth of the non-Muslims as spoils of war—all these are taught in a Quami Madrasa. As a student of Quami madrasa, I have learned all these theories too in my textbooks” (p. xix). Interestingly, the scholar also notes that Quami Madrasa headquarter is in Uttar Pradesh: Darul Uloom Deoband Madras. In the fourteen-chapter book, the authors have vehemently tapped onto the pulse of this Islamist jihad through various avenues. He thinks that he was trapped by the system called madrasa where he was fed with misconceptions about India to be a land where the Hindus are lynching Muslims and the rhetoric that ‘Muslims are unsafe in India’ (p. xvii). His misconception was broken when he read articles from published in the Desh, a popular Bengali magazine, where Hindu authors were criticizing Hindutva and they all were in their homeland. He wondered if this would ever be possible in any Islamic state for uttering a word against Islam or Islamist fanaticism would be seen as blasphemy and result in the speaker’s death or banishment. Moreover, he was baffled to see the ignorance of the leftist Bengali students at Jadavpur protesting against the Israel. But when he asked if they knew of the ideology of Hamas (which was religious warfare to exterminate Jews), they we dumbfounded. Such is the condition of the so-called ‘leftist’ students of West Bengal who go on to brag of their ‘intellectual’ status! Nevertheless, drawing a parallel between the anti-Semite Holocaust of the Jews in Germany to the Bengali Hindu Genocide in Bangladesh, Dr. Richard L. Benkin says in the preface that “there was an endemic nature to European Jew-hatred—not among all Europeans, but among enough—just as there is an endemic nature to Bangladeshi hatred of Hindus—not among all Bangladeshis but among enough” (p. xxiii). But, there is never a single word spoken on that by the left. The burden, therefore, falls on the factual and unbiased authors like Dr. Kausik Gangopadhyay and Devavrata. However, it must be noted that, before the left accuses the authors of ‘Islamophobia’, they have been careful enough not to label all Bangladeshis as vengeful, fanatic mobs while pinning at the issue at the same time: “We never claim the absence of a constituency for pluralism in Bangladesh but that constituency is too small and ever-shrinking in the politics adopted by Bangladesh. This small echelon of secular intellectuals who stand for pluralism and a secular Bengali identity, are feeling marginalised and sensing danger not only to their ideology but also to their physical self, considerably. Whereas we have the greatest respect for them as human beings, we could not cloud the reality out of our respect for them their vision of Bangladesh is not even the peripheral one, in the politics adopted by the society of Bangladesh. To draw a comparison, we may refer to the influential Communist intellectual echelons at prestigious American universities like Harvard University or University of California at Berkeley that were present even before the Second World War and continued for a long time. Nobody describes America a communist country until the fall of the communist bloc in the 1990s, because the dominant national narrative was anti-communist” (p. xlv).

Conclusion

    Finally, the work of an analyst is not just to explain the contents, but also to look for the missing elements. Here, I must say that I have a few reservations. I feel that the significant role of Gopal Patha (Gopal Mukhopadhyay) has not been adequately delineated. While reading the book, especially the chapters discussing the Great Calcutta Killings and Suhrawardy’s evils, I had been anticipating discussions on his charismatic role. Moreover, since there were repetitions of events and facts at times, the authors have expanded heavily and an uninitiated reader might find little difficulty to connect the dots of arguments. However, whatever little limitations or loopholes there are, they have been easily surpassed by the supine in-depth research of the authors.

• 10 min read
• 1
• 0